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INTRODUCTION
There have been three important changes in the appeal time require-
ments in the State of Florida within the past two decades. Each of these
changes has caused a great deal of confusion among the members of
the bar.
In 1943, after the abolition of writs of error as the method of ap-
pellate review, the Florida Supreme Court stated that: "Some confusion
at the bar existed as to the time for taking appeals from judgments and
decrees .. .
In 1951, Justice Fabisinski commenting on chapter 59 of the Florida
Statutes enacted in 1945, stated: "The conflicting provisions provide a trap
for the unwary .... "2
The Florida Appellate Rules occasioned similar distress after their
adoption 3 particularly in regard to appeal time limitations. Illustrative is
the appeal time requirement from the Civil Court of Record of Dade
County to the district court of appeal:4 in 1959-60 days.,5  in 1960-one
calendar month6 and in 1961-60 days.7
1. Russ v. Solomon, 152 Fla. 348, 349, 12 So.2d 121 (1943) (interpreting Fla. Laws
1941, ch. 20441).
2. Smith v. Fletcher Motor Sales, Inc., 62 So.2d 60, 62 (Fla. 1952) (concurring
opinion).
3. The Florida Appellate Rules as amended, January 1, 1960, became effective as
rules of court on July 1, 1957.
4. Compare FLA. STAT. § 33.11 (1959) with FLORIDA APPELLATE RULE 3.2(b)
(hereafter cited as F.A.R.).
5. In re Campbell's Guardianship, 114 So.2d 352, 354 n.3 (Fla. App. 1959).
6. Fuller v. Riley, 124 So.2d 499 (Fla. App. 1960).
7. Ed Lane Auto Sales, Inc. v. Weinstein, 132 So.2d 218 (Fla. App. 1961).
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This article is an attempt to clarify the present state of the Florida
law as to appeal time requirements. 8
1. GENERALLY
A. APPEAL TIMES ARE JURISDICTIONAL
Since the time fixed for taking an appeal is jurisdictional," an appellate
court has no jurisdiction after the appeal time has elapsed.10 It is incumbent
upon opposing counsel to bring this absence of jurisdiction to the court's
attention." But the court may also dismiss the appeal, sua sponte, when
it appears that the appeal time has expired.' 2
B. APPEAL TIMES CANNOT BE EXTENDED BY THE COURTS OR THE LITIGANTS
It is well settled that the time for taking appeals as well as the time
for filing petitions for writs of certiorari cannot be extended by the court. 3
Further, the litigants cannot extend the time by consent or stipulation.1
4
In Lalow v. Codomo,lr ' . the time for taking an appeal from a partial
summary judgment had expired. The trial judge entered an amended partial
summary judgment for the avowed purpose of providing the losing party
with an opportunity to appeal the first judgment. The Florida Supreme
Court, in dismissing the appeal, stated that the trial judge had no authority
to extend directly or indirectly the time for filing the notice of appeal. 1
A similar unsuccessful attempt to extend the appeal time by stipula-
tion is illustrated by Salinger v. Salinger.'7 The parties stipulated that an
amendment to the final decree would provide, "the effective date of such
final decree shall for all purposes be August 1, 1955."'8 The trial court
8. 'his paper is limited to appeal times and does not discuss such problems as
jurisdiction of the various appellate courts or methods of taking appeal, i.e., certiorari or
appeal, or the hazy problem of what is a final judgment, except when necessarily incidental
to the main problem.
9. Congregation Temple De Hirsch v. Aronson, 128 So.2d 585, 586 (Fla. 1961);
Ramagli Realty Co. v. Craver, 121 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1960); Donin v. Goss, 69 So.2d 316
(Fla. 1954); In re Warner's Estate, 159 Fla. 675, 32 So.2d 461 (1947); Cates v.
Heffernan, 154 Fla. 422, 18 So.2d 11 (1944); Harris v. Condermann, 113 So.2d 235
(Fla. App. 1959). Tlhc prescribed time limitation for filing a petition for a writ of
certiorari as established by the Florida Appellate Rules is also considered to be jurisdic-
tional. See Harris v. Condermann, supra.
10. Ibid. But the court does have jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal. See Congregation
Temple De Hirsch v. Aronson, supra note 9.
11. Donin v. Goss, 69 So.2d 316, 318 (Fla. 1954).
12. See Braunstein v. Silhouette, Inc., 113 So.2d 436 (Fla. App. 1959).
13. Congregation Temple De Hirsch v. Aronson, 128 So.2d 585 (Fla. 1961);
Salinger v. Salinger, 100 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1958); Cortina v. Cortina, 98 So.2d 334 (Fla.
1957); Lalow v. Codomo, 88 So.2d 752 (Fla. 1956); Wieczorek v. Williams, 71 So.2d
262 (Fla. 1954); Cates v. Heffernan, 154 Fla. 422, 18 So.2d 11 (1944); Whitaker v.
Sparkman, 30 Fla. 347, 11 So. 542 (1892); Jackson v. Haisley, 27 Fla. 205, 9 So. 648
(1891). For certiorari see Harris v. Condermann, 113 So.2d 235 (Fla. App. 1958).
14. Salinger v. Salinger, supra note 13; Donin v. Goss, 69 So.2d 316 (Fla. 1954);
Cates v. Heffernan, supra note 13.
15. 88 So.2d 752 (Fla. 1956).
16. Id. at 753.




entered an order in accordance with the stipulation. An appeal was filed
approximately 88 days after the rendition of the original order and 58 days
after the second order based upon the stipulation. The court dismissed
the appeal, reasoning that more than 60 days had elapsed from the date
of the original order and that neither the parties nor the trial court could
extend the time for taking an appeal. 19
C. RENDITION AS COMMENCING THE APPEAL TIME
The Florida Appellate Rules provide that appeals "shall be commenced
within 60 days from the rendition of the final decision, order, judgment
or decree appealed from .... -20
As commonly used, the term "rendition" describes the official act of
the court of signing the final decision, order, judgment or decree. The
phrase "entry of a judgment" describes the ministerial act of spreading
upon the record a statement of the final conclusion reached by the court.21
The term "rendition," as used in the Florida Appellate Rules, has a
different meaning than that described above. A court of general jurisdiction
speaks, only through its record. Until such time as the judgment, decision,
order or decree is entered of record there is no competent evidence of
its rendition.2 2 The date of the judgment as rendered within the con-
templation of the Florida Appellate Rules must therefore, necessarily be
the date of entry by the courts.
2 3
Schneider v. Cohan24 is a dramatic illustration of the difference be-
tween the two uses of the term. The issue in the case was whether or not
the 60 day appeal period had expired.25 A summary judgment dated
February 11, was filed and noted on the progress docket on the same date.
However, the judgment was not recorded in the minutes of the circuit
court until February 15. The filing of the appeal on April 15 was within
60 days from the date of recording, but longer than 60 days from the
date of filing, notation on the progress docket and the date of the sum-
mary judgment. The Supreme Court of Florida, in holding that the appeal
was timely filed, stated:
19. Id. at 394.
20. F.A.R. 3.2(b). (Emphasis added.)
21. Simmons v. Hanne, 50 Fla. 267, 270, 39 So. 77, 78 (1905).
22. Magnant v. Peacock, 156 Fla. 688, 690-91, 24 So.2d 314, 315 (1945).
23. F.A.R. 1.3. The definition section of the Florida Appellate Rules defines rendition
to mean, "that it has been reduced to writing, signed and made a matter of record ...."
In this connection, "A paper is deemed to be recorded when filed with the clerk and
assigned a book and page number." See also Brenner v. Gelernter, 90 So.2d 306 (Fla.
1956) where the supreme court reaffirmed its position that the word "rendition" means"entry." Accord, Christopher v. Oliver, 103 So.2d 240 (Fla. App. 1958) (decision under
the new Florida Appellate Rules citing 3.2(b) without comment).
24. 73 So.2d 69 (Fla. 1954).
25. The governing provision in this case was FLA. STAT. § 59.08 (1959) which is
Fla. Laws 1945, ch. 22854, at 834. Section 59.08 provides that "Appeals, including
petitions for review by certiorari, shall be taken or filed within 60 days from and after
the entry of the order . . . appealed from." It is to be noted that this statute is sub-
stantially the same as the present F.A.R. 3.2(b).
1961 ]
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the date of the signing of the judgment by the Circuit Judge or
the date the same is filed in the Clerk's office or the date the
same is noted in the Progress Docket is of no consequence. The
time begins to run from the effective date of the judgment and
that is the day it was actually entered, that is to say recorded, in
the Circuit Court minute book .
2
A judgment or decree in equity, similar to a judgment at law is only
considered rendered when entered in the court's records, to wit, the
chancery order book.
27
A note of caution is necessary at this point. The Florida Appellate
Rules provide that if recording is not required by statute, then the appeal
time begins to run as of the date of the filing of the order.28 The probate
statute which provides for filing is the most notable exception to the
general rule of rendition.
29
The foregoing discussion applies with equal force to petitions for writs
of certiorari. Florida Appellate Rule 4.5(c) (1) provides that application
for the writ shall be filed "within 60 days from the rendition of the
decision . . . sought to be reviewed."30
When by statute or rule, the time for review begins to run from an
event other than rendition or filing, it is highly probable that the Florida
courts will equate that event with entry. In Barry v. Robson,31 a petition for
certiorari was filed 61 days after the date of the final order, but 60 days
after its entry. The respondent in contesting the granting of the petition,
agreed that chapter 59 of the Florida Statutes provided for a time limita-
tion of 60 days from the entry of the final order.32 However, he argued
that the statute was nothing more than a rule of court and could be
superseded by subsequent rules. 3 The respondent then contended that the
Supreme Court Rule providing that the appeal time shall commence to run
from the "date of the order' 34 superseded section 59.08 of the Florida
26. Schneider v. Cohan, 73 So.2d 69, 70 (Fla. 1954). (Emphasis added.)
27. As to the proposition of entry on the court's records, see generally: Ramagli
Realty Co. v. Craver, 121 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1960) (citing F.A.R. 3.2(b) and 1.1); Salinger
v. Salinger, 100 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1958); Brenner v. Gelernter, 90 So.2d 306 (Fla. 1956);
Schneider v. Cohan, 73 So.2d 69 (Fla. 1954); Barry v. Robson, 65 So.2d 739 (Fla. 1954);
Winn & Lovett Grocery Co. v. Luke, 156 Fla. 638, 24 So.2d 310 (1945); Magnant v.
Peacock, 156 Fla. 688, 24 So.2d 314 (1945); Wildwood Crate & Ice Co. v. Citizens'
Bank, 98 Fla. 186, 123 So. 699 (1929) (chancery).
28. F.A.R. 1.3.
29. FLA. STAT. § 732.16 (1959). See generally, 1 FLA. LAw & PRAC. Appeals § 28
(1955). Based upon In re Wartman's Estate, 128 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1961), it is arguable
that the constitutional basis for this statute has been removed and thus recording, and
not filing, is determinative in probate matters. See infra the general discussion of shorter
appeal times.
30. See Barry v. Robson, 65 So.2d 739 (Fla. 1954).
31. Ibid.
32. See note 25 supra.
33. FLA. STAT. § 59.44 (1959) provides that the chapter is to be considered as
rules of court, and "may be changed ... or superseded by rules adopted by the supreme
court of this state."
34. Sup. CT. R. 28 (1949) which is substantially the same as Sup. CT. R. 22 (1955)
(a recodification) (Emphasis added.); see 31 FLA. STAT. ANN. 493 (1956).
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Statutes which provided that the time shall commence from the "entry of
the order."35 The Supreme Court of Florida, in granting the writ of cer-
tiorari,3 6 construed the "date of the order" to mean the effective date, a
construction serving to equate the Supreme Court Rule with the statutory
provision.
D. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL AND PETITIONS FOR REHEARING
AS AFFECTING "RENDITION"
A judgment is not considered rendered until a timely and proper
motion or petition for a new trial, rehearing or reconsideration is disposed
of by the lower courtY7 A contrary result would place the attorney for the
losing party in the position of being required to take an appeal while his
petition or motion was still pending before the trial court.3 8 Consequently,
the appellate court could well be asked to do the very thing which the
lower court had already done.
Prior to the present appellate rules, it was well settled that a timely
motion for a new trial tolled the time requirement.3 9 When a petition for
rehearing of an equitable decree granting affirmative relief was desired, it
was necessary to secure an order to stay the running of the time period
and the operation of the decree.40 However, when the equitable decree
did not grant affirmative relief, the petition itself, similar to the motion for
a new trial at law, operated to toll the time.41  This apparent distinction
was based upon the fact that when affirmative relief was not asked for,
the decree was self-executing, and there was no proceeding for a stay order
to operate upon.4
2
In 1956 this distinction was obliterated by the supreme court's decision
in Ganzer v. Ganzer.43 The court stated that the purpose for tolling the
time for appeal, when a timely motion for new trial or petition for rehearing
was presented to the trial court, was to avoid the necessity for taking an
appeal until it was determined that there was, in fact, a need for an appeal.
35. Fi. STAT. § 59.08 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
36. Barry v. Robson, 65 So.2d 739, 740 (Fla. 1954).
37. F.A.R. 1.3 provides: "Where there has been a timely and proper motion or
petition for a new trial, rehearing or reconsideration by the lower court, the decision,
judgment, order or decree shall not be deemed rendered until such motion or petition
is disposed of." See Bannister v. Allen, 127 So.2d 907 (Fla. App. 1961) (petition for
rehearing). It is to be noted that the term "disposed of" in the rule means filed and
recorded by the clerk. See Seiferth v. Seiferth, 121 So.2d 689 (Fla. App. 1960).
38. Kent v. Marvin, 59 So.2d 791, 793 (Fla. 1952).
39. Kent v. Marvin, supra note 38; City of Orlando v. Hewitt, 92 Fla. 933, 110
So. 874 (1926).
40. Ludman Corp. v. Moyer, 61 So.2d 424 (Fla. 1952); Lauderdale by the Sea
Dcv. Co. v. Lauderdale Surf & Yacht Estates, Inc., 160 Fla. 929, 37 So.2d 364 (1948).
41. Beck v. Littlefield, 65 So.2d 723 (Fla. 1953); Kent v. Marvin, 59 So.2d 791
(Fla. 1952); Hollywood, Inc. v. Clark, 153 Fla. 501, 15 So.2d 175 (1943); O'Steen v.
Thomas, 146 Fla. 73, 200 So. 230 (1941); Dade County v. Snyder, 134 Fla. 756, 184
So. 489 (1938).
42. Beck v. Littlefield, supra note 41.
43. 84 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1956); cf. Brenner v. Gelernter, 90 So.2d 306 (Fla. 1956)
(dicta).
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The court held that no reason existed for the distinction in equitable actions
granted affirmative relief, and consequently abolished it.44
The Motion or Petition Must be Timely
Under both the case law and the Florida Appellate Rules the petition
for rehearing and the motion for new trial must be timely filed.45 A motion
for a new trial at law is timely filed if served not later than 10 days after
the rendition of verdict.4 6 A petition for rehearing in equity is timely filed
if it is served within 10 days47 after the recording of the decree.48 Rendition
and recording in this context are synonymous.
The present rules, as did the prior case law, require that the motion
for new trial or petition for rehearing be a proper one. This simply means
that a regularized procedure must exist for obtaining a rehearing or a new
trial. It is evident that when a party moves for a new trial in an equitable
action, the motion is improper. 41 Of course, greater difficulty is presented
in less obvious situations. For example, a petition for rehearing by the losing
party after an order granting a summary judgment has been entered is not
a proper motion. 50 There is neither a statutory provision nor a rule of pro-
cedure providing for a rehearing after the entry of a summary judgment.
The only method of challenging the propriety of the summary judgment is
by direct appeal."1
By way of further illustration, assume that a litigant petitions for re-
hearing after a summary judgment has been entered against him. Sixty one
days after the final judgment, the trial judge denies the motion. In this
situation, the 60 day appeal time has run; the petition for rehearing, since
improper, did not operate to toll the time requirement. Thus, the petition-
ing party's appeal time has expired and the litigation is at an end.
If a litigant desires to avoid this result by filing a notice of appeal
while his petition for rehearing is pending before the trial court, the filing
44. Ganzcr v. Ganzer, supira note 43, at 592.
45. See sup/ra note 37 and cases cited sup/ra notes 40, 41.
46. FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.8(b).
47. FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.16(a).
48. The ten day time requirement for filing a petition for rehearing is applicable
also to motions addressed to the district courts of appeal for the certification of their
decisions. After the ten day time period for petitioning a district court of appeal for
rehearing has elapsed, a party litigant is not entitled to petition a district court of appeal
to have its decision certified as a decision passing upon a question of great public interest.
Whitaker v. Jacksonville Expressway Authority, 131 So.2d 22, 24 (Fla. App. 1961).
49. By the same token a petition for rehearing in a law action is improper. For
example in Mathis v. Butler, 128 So.2d 142, 143 (Fla. App. 1961), the court ordered a
remittitur or in the alternative a new trial. [ he plaintiff accepted the remittitur. The
defendant then petitioned for a rehearing on the amount of the remittitur. It was held
that the defendant's motion was improper.
50. Counne v. Saffan, 87 So.2d 586 (Fla. 1956); Weisberg v. Per], 73 So.2d 56
(Fla. 1954); Aurremma v. B-Thrifty Super Mkt., Inc., 127 So.2d 682 (Fla. App. 1961);
Marans v. Stang, 124 So.2d 891 (Fla. App. 1960); La Joie v. General Motors Acceptance




of the notice of appeal will serve as an abandonment of the petition for
rehearing.
2
Ramagli Realty Co. v. Craver 3 is a striking example of an im-
proper motion. The losing party moved that the trial court vacate a default
judgment. The motion was granted and the default judgment was vacated,
apparently eliminating the necessity for an appeal. Four months after the
first judgment was rendered, the original default judgment was reinstated.
The Florida Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the time limi-
tation of 60 days computed from the date of the final default judgment
had expired and accordingly the district court of appeal was without juris-
diction to hear the appeal. The supreme court stated that the motion to
vacate the default judgment was improper, and thus did not operate to
toll the time. In reaching this result, the court reasoned that neither the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, nor any other statute or rule provided
for any method of procedure relating to the opening of default judgments
by trial courts.54 There being no provision for opening default judgments,
the only method of reconsideration was by direct appeal within 60 days
from the entry of the final judgment. "
The question of the existence of procedures to open default judgments
is not within the scope of this article. 6 However, in the case of a flagrant
error committed by a trial court in granting a default or summary judgment,
it is questionable whether a trial court should be powerless to correct its
own error, thereby forcing litigants to prosecute an appeal whose outcome
is certain.57 Indeed, is this not the very situation which the rule regarding
the tolling of time for appeals was designed to prevent, viz., the doing of
a useless act?58
52. Frank v. Pioneer Metals, Inc., 114 So.2d 329 (Fla. App. 1959).
53. 121 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1960).
54. Id. at 653.
55. It is interesting to note that the court recognized that prior to the effective date
of the rules of civil procedure, the case law had allowed the court to vacate and set aside
default judgments. The court held that these decisions were rendered inapplicable because
the new provisions had done away with terms of court, wherein the court had complete
control over its judgments and power to vacate, modify and set them aside during the
term in which they were rendered. Ramagli Realty Co. v. Craver, 121 So.2d 648, 653
(Fla. 1960) and the cases cited therein at n. 17.
56. The court in Ramagli, recognized that default judgments could be set aside or
vacated when such judgments were procured by fraud, deceit or other cause which would
render it void. However, the court indicated that such is not the case for judgments
which were merely voidable or erroneously entered. Ramagli Realty Co. v. Craver, supra
note 55. See comment, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 109 (1961).
57. In this connection one might speculate as to the meaning of the term "motion
for reconsideration" as used in Florida Appellate Rule 1.3.
58. The Third District Court of Appeal is apparently taking a position opposite to
the Florida Supreme Court. The former has allowed the trial court to hear the motion
to vacate the default judgment and then taken certiorari to review the lower court in
order to ascertain if there has been an abuse of discretion in denying or granting the
motion to vacate. Bursten v. Cooper, 127 So.2d 134 (Fla. App. 1961); White v. Spears,
123 So.2d 689 (Fla. App. 1960). The practical effect of this rationale is to allow the
lower court to set aside defaults. Although these decisions may occasion a better result,
their propriety is at best questionable in the face of Ramagli, in which the Third District
Court of Appeal was reversed.
1961]
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Application of the Rule to Probate 'Matters
Prior to the revision of the Florida appellate court structure by the
1957 constitutional amendment and the adoption of the Florida Appellate
Rules, the provisions relating to tolling the time when a petition for re-
hearing or a motion for new trial was timely filed did not apply to county
judge's courts in probate matters.5 9 This exception was based upon the fact
that the county judge's courts were omitted from the group of courts
designated in the enabling statute6" as subject to the rules of practice and
procedure promulgated by the supreme court.61 Further, in the absence of
statutory authority, only the legislature could provide for the tolling of the
time, and section 732.19,2 of the Florida Statutes, relating to appeals from
probate matters, did not so provide.
Appeals from the county judge's courts in probate matters are included
within the scope of the present appellate rules. There are two reasons
sustaining such a conclusion. First, the supreme court under the Florida
Constitution, has the power to regulate practice and procedure for all
courts.6 3 This constitutional power grant, unlike the enabling statute,
6 4
includes the county judge's courts within its coverage. Second, granting
that the supreme court has the power to adopt appellate rules governing
appeals in probate matters, the Florida Appellate Rules specifically provide
that they are to be applicable to appeals from the county judge's courts
in probate matters.6 5 It affirmatively appears that the objection raised in
the case of In re Estate of Minola M. Leer6 that the county judge's courts
were specifically exempted from the provisions of the rules, has been
overcome.67
Administrative Proceedings - Petitions for Rehearing
In reviews of administrative proceedings, whether by appeal or cer-
tiorari, a petition for rehearing operates as a supersedeas unless a statute
59. In re Estate of Minola M. Lee, 90 So.2d 290 (Fla. 1956). The court held that
a petition for rehearing in probate was not a "proper motion." The court stated: "We
find no provision of the statute or rules which authorizes or recognizes a petition for
rehearing in such instances. . . . There being no authority for a petition for rehearing
.in the circumstances of this case, such a petition does not toll the time for taking an
appeal." Id. at 290.
60. Fla. Laws 1943, ch. 21995, §§ 1-6, at 688 (repealed).
61. Originally FLA. EQUITY Rs. 70, 71 (1950) superseded by FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.16.
See also Sup. CT. R. 45 (1955).
62. FLA. STAT. § 732.19 (1959).
63. FLA. CoNs'r. art. V, § 3.
64. Fla. Laws 1943, ch. 21995, §§ 1-6, at 688 (repealed).
65. F.A.R. 4.4 provides: "The Florida Appellate Rules relating to appeals shall apply
to appeals from final orders or decrees of county judge's courts pertaining to probate
matters or to estates and interests of minors and incompetents."
66. 90 So.2d 290 (Fla. 1956).
67. By way of further clarification, the court in In re Estate of Minola M. Lee,
suwpra note 66, held that a petition for rehearing in probate was not a proper motion.
However, eight years before, the supreme court had recognized that a petition for rehearing
was a proper motion in probate. In re Warner's Estate, 160 Fla. 153, 33 So.2d 728
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specifically provides for the necessity of a stay order.68 Although no cases
have been decided since the adoption of the appellate rules, it is submitted
that a stay order is no longer necessary when review is by certiorari. The
supreme court has the power to regulate all provisions necessary for the
granting of writs of certiorari, including the computation of tolling of the
review time requirements.69 Accordingly, the Florida Appellate Rule which
provides that the petition operates as a supersedeas will prevail over contrary
statutory enactments.70 However, when an appeal from an administrative
agency is provided for by statute as a matter of right,71 the statutory
provisions will prevail.
72
E. WHEN IS AN APPEAL DEEMED COMMENCED?
An appeal is commenced under the Florida Appellate Rules by filing
a notice of appeal and depositing the filing fee prescribed by law with the
clerk of the lower court.
73
Prior to the adoption of the appellate rules it was well settled that
the timely and proper filing of the notice of appeal was a jurisdictional
prerequisite to an appellate court exercising its powers of review. 74 Con-
sequently, the appellate rule75 providing that filing of the notice of appeal
shall give the court jurisdiction is merely a recodification of the former
Supreme Court Rule 12,7" and is similar in import to section 59.0177 of
(1948). An analysis of the WVarner case reveals that the court based its holding upon
sections 63.70, 63.71 of the chancery procedure act. Fla. Laws 1931, ch. 14658, §§ 70,
71, at 72. These provisions were repealed by Fla. Laws 1951, ch. 26962, § 2, at 1210.
The repealing act indicated that the rules were superseded because of the promulgation
of the "now new existing equity rules" pursuant to section 25.47 (Fla. Laws 1943, ch.
21995, §§ 1-6, at 688) which were intended to apply in the place of the statute. Unfortu-
nately, the county judge's courts were omitted from the coverage of the statutory enabling
act. Thus the equity rules, FLA. EQUITY Rs. 70, 71 (1950), adopted pursuant to the
enabling statute could not apply to the probate courts even though the legislature
apparently intended the rules to be applicable. See -In. re McRae's Estate, 73 So.2d 818
(Fla. 1954). This inadvertant error occasioned a like result in all cases where rules were
promulgated by the supreme court. As indicated in the text, the 1957 constitutional
amendment changed this result, for unlike the statutory enabling act no court is omitted
from the constitutional enabling provisions. This constitutional authority should operate
to reinstate the court's holding in the Warner case, supra, which recognized that a petition
for rehearing in the county judge's court is a proper motion.
68. Redwing Carriers v. Carter, 64 So.2d 557 (Fla. 1953).
69. Wilson v. McCoy Mfg. Co., 69 So.2d 659 (Fla. 1954); Harris v. Condermann,
113 So.2d 235 (Fla. App. '1959). See also general discussion on appeals from administra-
tive bodies.
70. F.A.R. 4.5; cases cited note 69 supra.
71. See State v. Furen, 118 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1960).
72. See the general discussion on shorter appeal times and appeals from administrative
bodies for a further analysis of the area.
73. F.A.R. 3.2(a).
74. State ex rel. Diamond Berk Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Carroll, 102 So.2d 129 (Fla.
1958); Counne v. Saffan, 87 So.2d 586 (Fla. 1956). Cf. F.A.R. 3.2(d).
75. F.A.R. 3.2(d) provides: "EFFECT OF FILING NOTICE. The filing of the
notice of appeal and deposit of the filing fee with the clerk of the lower court shall give the
Court jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties to the appeal."
76. SuP. CT. R. 12(5).
77. FLA. STAT. § 59.01 (1959)..
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the Florida Statutes. The filing requirement is applicable to final and
interlocutory appeals,"' criminal appeals 79 and petitions for writs of cer-
tiorari. 0
The supreme court in State ex rel. Diamond Berk Insurance Agency,
Inc. v. Carroll,81 strictly construed the filing of the notice of appeal re-
quirement.8 2 Through a clerical error the original filing of the notice of
appeal was with the clerk of the appellate court rather than with the clerk
of the lower court as required by the appellate rules. The supreme court
was "compelled" to hold that the appellate rule required timely filing of
the notice of the appeal at the place required by the rules.83
The new appellate rules apparently added an additional jurisdictional
requirement, non-existent under the former statutes or conforming rules.84
On.e of the new rules85 provides that the filing of the notice of appeal and
deposit of the filing fee shall give the court jurisdiction. The word "ap-
parently" is used because the only case directly on point held that the
requirement of deposit of the filing fee is not jurisdictional. In this case,
State ex rel. Moore v. Murphree,86 an appeal was taken from the county
judge's court to the circuit court. Although the notice of appeal was filed
within the 2 day time period required by section 83.2787 of the Florida
Statutes, the filing fee was not paid until 11 days thereafter and then in
the wrong amount. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss, and
the respondent brought a writ of prohibition in the district court of appeal.
The latter court denied the writ and in that fashion affirmed the circuit
court.
The appellate court evidently followed the maxim that remedial sta-
tutes should be liberally construed. In this connection, the court was of
the opinion that, "the rule must yield to dictates of reason and ethics
upon which the law is founded."88 The court reinforced its reasoning when
78. F.A.Rs. 4.2(b) & (g).
79. F.A.R. 4.5(c)(1). It is to be noted that applications for writs of certiorari are
filed with the clerk of the iappellate court rather than the clerk of the lower court as in
other cases.
80. F.A.R. 6.4.
81. 102 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1958).
82. Although the filing requirement is strictly construed, the failure of the lower
court clerk to transmit a certified copy of the notice and the filing fee to the clerk of
the appellate court is not considered to be jurisdictional. F.A.R. 3.2(d). Other require-
ments not jurisdictional in nature apparently are liberally construed. For example, sub-
stantial compliance with the content requirement of the notice is sufficient. Seaboard
Air Line R.R. v. Holt, 80 So.2d 354 (Fla. 1955); followed in State ex tel. Diamond Berk
Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Carroll, supra note 81 (dicta).
83. Id. at 130.
84. See for example FT.A. STA'r. § 59.01(8) (1959).
85. F.A.R. 3.2(d).
86. 106 So.2d 430 (Fla. App. 1958).
87. FLA. STAT. § 83.27 (1959). See also FLA. STAT. § 83.38 (1959) which provides
for a ten day time limitation in landlord-tenant removal cases originally instituted in the
county courts.
88. State ex rel. Moore v. Murphree, 106 So.2d 430, 432 (Fla. App. 1958).
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it stated that section 83.27 and 83.2889 which provide for appeal times in
this situation, do not provide that a filing fee must be paid in order to
prosecute an appeal. They further indicated that the former rule90 as to
the payment of the filing fee was disconnected and had no relationship
to the statutes and rules concerning the jurisdictional requirements of filing
the n.otice of appeal. The lumping together of these two provisions, the
filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of the filing fee, occurred
doubtless from inadvertance and the rule as to the payment of the filing
fee was not to be considered jurisdictional."M But, of course, this lumping
together is equally susceptible of the opposite inference, that the rule as
to payment of the filing fee was intended to be jurisdictional.
The conclusion is inescapable that despite the result reached in Mur-
phree, the appellate rule, prima facie, makes the payment of the filing fee
jurisdictional.
It might prove costly to take the Murphree decision at face value until
such time as other Florida courts substantiate the result of the case, especially
in the teeth of the strict construction given by the supreme court in State
ex rel. Diamond Berk Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Carroll.
92
F. TAXATION OF COSTS
Since 1832,11'3 a provision concerning taxation of costs has appeared in
either the rules of court or the statutes. Thc provision of the Florida Ap-
pellate Rule is substantially the same as prior rules,9 4 and in effect provides
that no appeal may be taken by the original plaintiff until he shall have
first paid all costs accrued in the first suit which have been specifically
taxed against him.95
In addition, the new rule 6 incorporates former Supreme Court Rule
29, '17 which provided that when taxation, of costs is assigned as error and
a supersedeas of the order taxing the costs has been obtained, repaymenit
of the costs is not required.
While these provisions are not jurisdictional," any broad statement
may prove to be misleading. The provisions of the rule are mandatory,
and when a proper and timely motion, is made the court is without discre-
tion and must dismiss the appeal. 9 Failure 'to comply with this rule will
89. See note 87 supra.
90. SuP. CT. R. 12(2) (1955) (filing); Sup. Cr. R. 2(5) (1955) (filing fee).
91. State ex rel. Moore v. Murphree, 106 So.2d 430, 432 (Fla. App. 1958).
92. 102 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1958).
93. Fla. Act Feb. 10, 1832, § 7. For the history and source of this act see notes
following FLA. STAT. ANN. § 59.09 (1969).
94. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 59.09 (1959).
95. F.A.R. 3.2(f).
96. Ibid.
97. SUP. CT. R. 29 (1955).
98. O'Connell v. Mason, 93 So.2d 71 (Fla. 1957).
99. Funke v. Federal Trust Co., 99 So.2d 636, 637 (Fla. App. 1958); Spector v.
Ahrenholz, 99 So.2d 714 (Fla. App. 1958). See also the earlier cases collected in Spector
v. Ahrenholz, supra.
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cause a prompt termination of the litigation.100 However, unlike a jurisdic-
tional requirement the provisions of this rule are for the benefit of the
defendant and may be waived.101
G. COMPUTATION OF TIME: SATURDAYS, SUNDAYS AND LEGAL HOLmDAYS
1°2
Exclude the First Day - Include the Last
The Florida Appellate Rule 103 is declaratory of a long established law
in Florida, that in computing time from a particular day, or when the act
is to be performed within a specified period after a day named, the first
day designated is excluded and the last day of the period is included.
10 4
Intervening Saturdays, Sundays and Legal Holidays
If the time period in question is shorter than seven. days, all Saturdays,
Sundays and legal holidays are excluded in the computation of the time
period, °,5 absent a contrary legislative declaration. 100 The correlative rule
provides that if the time period is longer than seven days, all Saturdays,
Sundays and legal holidays are to be included in the computation, absent
a contrary legislative declaration. 07
The Florida Appellate Rule'0s which codified the preceding proposition
did not provide that the legislature could enact a contrary rule for the
computation of the appellate time. However, it is arguable that the power
to establish rules for the computation of time is a necessary auxiliary to
100. In one interesting case, Villanueva v. Shayne, Inc., 96 So.2d 537 (Fla. 1957),
the costs were taxed against the plaintiff. After the defendant had filed a notice of
appeal, the plaintiff filed a joinder of appeal without paying the costs taxed against him
or assigning the payment of costs as error. Upon proper and timely motion, the court
dismissed the plaintiff's joinder of appeal on the grounds that the plaintiff should not be
allowed to accomplish indirectly that which could not 'have been accomplished directly.
101. For example, in Funke v. Federal Trust Co., 99 So.2d 636 (Fla. App. 1958),
entering into a stipulation for an extension of time in which to file a brief constituted a
waiver. See also O'Connell v. Mason, 93 So.2d 71 (Fla. 1957); Berb v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 81 So.2d 630 (Fla. 1955).
102. The prior rule did not include Saturdays and legal holidays within the scope of
its operation. Accordingly, the case law dealt only with Sundays. However, the new
appellate rule, F.A.R. 3.18 includes such days within its operation. As a result, Saturdays
and legal holidays are included within the discussion of the prior cases in that the
holding of these cases will apply with equal force to Saturdays and legal holidays.
103. F.A.R. 3.18 provides: "In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed
by these rules, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event
or default from which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included.
The last day of the period so computed shall be counted .... "
104. Simmons v. Hanne, 50 Fla. 267, 39 So. 77 (1905); Savage v. State, 18 Fla.
970 (1882).
105. Smithie v. State, 88 Fla. 70, 101 So. 276 (1924); Croissant v. DeSoto Improve-
ment Co., 87 Fla. 530, 101 So. 37 (1924).
106. Sinithie v. State, stpra note 105.
107. Cases cited note 105 supra.
108. The applicable portion of F.A.R. 3.18 provides: "Vhen the period of time
prescribed or allowed shall be less than 7 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and
legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation. A half holiday shall be considered
as any other day and not as a holiday."
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the power to establish the time for appeal, an admitted legislative power.109
On the other hand, it should be born.e in mind that the Florida Constitu-
tion 110 has given the supreme court the power to regulate practice and
procedure. In furtherance of this power, the court has enacted rule 3.18,111
dealing with the exclusion of these days, without a savings clause providing
for contrary legislative enactments. It would defeat the purpose of the ap-
pellate rules to hold that all incidental rules relating to the time for appeal
requirements are controlled by the legislature. The most satisfactory and
probable result would be a holding that the exclusion of Saturdays, Sun-
days and legal holidays in regard to the computation of time is peculiarly
within the sphere of the supreme court's constitutional power and not
weakened by the possibility of a contrary legislative enactment."'
Exclusion of the Last Day of the Period When That Day
is a Saturday, Sunday or Legal Holiday
The original position of the Florida courts was that when an act was
to be performed in fulfillment of a statutory requirement, the time period
was not extended if the last day fell on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday,
unless the legislative intent to exclude these days from the computation
was manifested in some manner.
13
The rationale of this rle was, simply, when the legislature fixes a
limitation of time more than seven days it knows that the period must
necessarily include one or more Saturdays, or Sundays, and hen.ce, if it
intends to exclude them, it can and should say so.114 Absent such a statu-
tory provision, the judiciary through the adoption of rules of court has
the power to exclude these days.1"
Subsequently, pursuant to the enabling statute, section 25.47116 of the
Florida Statutes, the supreme court enacted a rule of practice which ex-
cluded these days from the computation of the time requirement, a rule
contrary to the court's prior position. In Carlile v. Spofford,117 the court was
called upon to resolve the clash between the two diametrically opposed
rules.
109. Ramagli Realty Co. v. Craver, 121 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1960). See also the
general discussion of this area under the topic, Power to Regulate Practice and Procedure
infra.
110. FLA. CoNsr. art. V, § 3.
111. F.A.R. 3.18.
112. The foregoing discussion is to be restricted to appellate review by direct appeal
as opposed to review by certiorari. See infra notes 216-31 and accompanying text.
113. Simmons v. Hanne, 50 Fla. 267, 39 So. 77 (1905).
114. Id. at 274, 39 So. at 80. This position was carried forward in Newsom
v. State, 54 So.2d 58 (Fla. 1951) (appeal from a conviction of armed robbery); In re
Warner's Estate, 160 Fla. 103, 33 So.2d 728 (1948).
115. Bacon v. State, 22 Fla. 46 (1886).
116. Fla. Laws 1943. ch. 21995, §§ 1-6, at 688 (repealed).
117. 65 So.2d 545 (Fha. 1953).
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In that case, an appeal was taken from the circuit court to the supreme
court. The 60th day of the appeal time was a Sunday and the appeal was
lodged on the 61st day, a Monday. According to its prior position, the
time for taking ant appeal was a statutory requirement. Since the statute
did not specifically provide for the exclusion of Sunday in the computation
of the appeal time, the prior position of the court demanded that the
appeal be dismissed. The court, in holding that the appeal was timely
filed," 8 disregarded its prior position and utilized Common Law Rule 7
(a) and Equitable Rule 32(a), both of which provided for the exclusion
of Sundays from the time computation. ,
In the subsequent case of In re McRae's Estate,'" the supreme court
affirmed its position in Carlile by again reasoning that the enabling statute
had given the court the authority to make rules of practice and procedure.
However, the case was distinguished from Carlile, and an opposite result
was reached because the enabling statute did not give the supreme court
the power to make rules of practice and procedure for the county judge's
courts. The supreme court held that in this case as well as in all other
cases when an appeal is taken from the county judge's court in probate
matters, its prior position was still the controlling rule.
120
Thus, at the time of the adoption of the Florida Appellate Rules,'
21
Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays falling on the last day of the appeal
time were excluded, except for the computation of time for appeals from
the county judge's court in probate matters. The Florida Appellate Rules
were specifically made applicable to probate matters' 22 and thus the objec-
tion. of In re McRae's Estate 23 has now been obviated.
At the risk of being repititious, it is necessary to raise the problem of
the power of the legislature over the judiciary in this area. Rarnagli Realty
Co. v. Craver'2 4 suggests that the power to provide the period of time for
obtaining appellate review is a power possessed by the legislature. It is not
unreasonable to assume that the power to establish rules incident to the
power to establish appeal times is likewise within legislative control. It
would then follow, that the power to establish rules concerning the in-
118. Ibid.
119. 73 So.2d 818 (Fla. 1954).
120. Id. at 819, 820. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
121. F.A.R. 3.18 provides:
The last day of the period so computed shall be counted, unless it is a Saturday,
Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the period shall run until the end of
a next day which is neither a Saturday, Sunday nor a legal holiday. . . .If an act
be required to be performed on a day certain and such day fall on a Saturday,
Sunday, or legal holiday, the act shall be performned on the next day which is
neither a Saturday, Sunday nor a legal holiday.
122. F.A.R. 4.4.
123. 73 So.2d 818 (Fla. 1954).
124. 121 So.2d 648 652 (Fla. 1960). See also the general discussion as to Power
to Regulate Practice and Procedure infra.
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elusion, or exclusion of these days for the purposes of computing the time
for appeal is solely within legislative control. It must be strongly reiterated
that the aforementioned assumption will do violence to the intent and
purpose of the Florida Appellate Rules. If the court in Carlile could
provide that its own rules would control on the authority of an enabling
statute, certainly the court can now hold that its own rules will prevail
over contrary legislative enactments on the authority of a constitutional
provision. 1
25
The foregoing discussion must be restricted to review by appeal as
opposed to review by certiorari. The supreme court has the unfettered
power to regulate the time for review through the medium of certiorari,
and this power includes the incidental power to establish rules for the
computation of the time requirement.
26
Combinations of Excluded Days
The supreme court in Azales Homes, Inc. v. Makela'21 refused to extend
the Carlile rationale when the 60th day for appeal fell on a Sunday, July 4,
the 61st day fell on a legal holiday, July 5, and the petition for certiorari
was taken on the 62nd day, a Tuesday. The court dismissed the appeal as
not timely. The Florida Appellate Rules have changed this result. The
rules provide in effect, that the period shall run until the end of the next
day which is neither a Saturday, Sunday, nor a legal holiday. 28
II. POWER TO REGULATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
The revision of the Florida appellate court system in 1957 heralded
the promulgation of the Florida Appellate Rules of Practice and Procedure.
The rules were adopted under the authority of article five, section three
of the Florida Constitution which provides: "The practice and procedure
in all courts shall be governed by rules adopted by the supreme court."
12"
The rles were designed to control the practice and procedure in all
three appellate tribunals. Rule 1.1 provides: "From their effective date
they shall govern all proceedings in the Supreme Court, the district courts
of appeal, and the circuit courts in the exercise of their appellate juris-
diction."1
30
125. See note 110 supra.
126. Zeller v. Industrial Research, Inc., 77 So.2d 616 (Fla. 1955); Florida E. Coast
Ry. v. George, 91 Fla. 42, 107 So. 266 (1926).
127. 77 So.2d 451 (Fla. 1955).
128. See note 121 supra.
129. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3.
130. F.A.R. 1.1.
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In order to prevent the possible conflict of the rules with pre-existing
statutes, the rules provide for the superseding of all conflicting statutes
and rules. Statutes and other rulesl 3  not conflicting with the appellate
rules remain in effect as rules promulgated by the supreme court.
13 2
Notwithstanding a plain, reading, the scope of the rules has presented
perplexing problems. Merely because the supreme court enacted a particular
rule does not necessarily mean that it was within the constitutional power
of the court to have done so. An analysis of the rules demands a determina-
tion of the scope of their power source. This is, in effect, a determination
of the meaning of the terms, practice and procedure. Once the scope of
the rules has been ascertained, an additional determination is necessary
as to which statutes have been superseded by the new appellate rules and
which statutes continue in force as rules of court. It is altogether possible
that a statute may have been continued in part and superseded in part.
These problems, like Banquo's ghost, appear at disconcerting times
and are being resolved in a rather piecemeal fashion. This particular section
is devoted to resolving these problems as they relate to the power to regulate
and establish times for appeal.
The terms, practice and procedure, as a practical matter are synonym-
ous. They can be said to be the form or mode of proceedings in courts of
justice for the enforcement of rights or the redress of wrongs, as distinguish-
ed from the substantive law which gives the right or denounces the wrong.
It contemplates the "how" of the thing with a view toward the orderly
dispatch and administration of justice.'
33
What of appeal times? Are they substantive law, establishing a right-
duty, or are they requirements as to the mode of proceeding? The Florida
Supreme Court in Rarnagli Realty Co. v. Craver1 3 4 held that:
The determination of the time in which appeals may be taken is
a legislative and not a judicial function. The power of this Court
under the Constitution to adopt rules or procedure does not encom-
pass the power to prescribe the time in which appeals may be
prosecuted.135
131. In the case of In re Wartman's Estate, 128 So.2d 600, 603 (Fla. 1961), the
supreme court commenting as to its holding in Rarnagli Realty Co. v. Craver stated:
"Under this decision, the last three words in the rule, viz. 'or these rules' must be
regarded as surplusage." See text at note 151 infra.
132. F.A.R. 1.4.
133. See generally BLACK, LAW DICrIONARY (4th. ed. 1951); Joiner & Miller, Rules
of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Tudicial Rule Making, 55 MICH. L. REV. 623,
634-35 (1957). For a complete bibliography of contemporary writing see STAFF OF
ADVISORY COMM. ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, STATE OF N.Y., THIRD PRELIMINARY
REPORT 891 (1959).
134. 121 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1960).
135. 'Id. at 652.
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This blanket explanation without supporting rationale is unfortunate.
The fact remains that the judiciary has established the time for appeals
in the Florida Appellate Rules. 136 Does the court intend to imply that
such a provision is unconstitutional? Certainly not. The subsequent para-
graphs represent an attempt to explain the court's statement.
Ramagli cited as authority 137 the decision in Reed v. Cromer,138 a
1923 case. That case concerned the problem of whether or not the 90 day
appeal time provided for by statute, could be modified or changed by the
court, or waived by the appellee. The court concluded that as it lacked
the power or authority to modify or change the requirement, it certainly
would be a strange doctrine to permit a party litigant to waive this re-
quirement. 39
Two points should be noted: (1) in the Reed case, the court was not
concerned with a conflicting rule of court; (2) the Reed case was decided
in 1923 and the Ramagli case in 1960, after the adoption of the constitu-
tional provision concerning the regulation of practice and procedure.
The concept of separation of powers, which divides our state govern-
ment into three branches, does not establish a distinct line of demarcation.
Rather, the successful functioning of the system demands some overlapping
of functions and cooperation between the branches. If the judiciary has
the power to establish a particular rule of practice and procedure, it is
elementary that until it has pre-empted the field through a rule of court,
a legislative enactment is to be recognized as valid and is to be given full
force and effect. If the legislature has the exclusive power until it has pre-
empted the field, a rule of court will be given full force and effect.
40 With
these rules in mind, assuming that the judiciary had the power to establish
appeal time limitations, the absence of a contrary rule of court in the Reed
case necessarily resulted in the court giving effect to the legislative enact-
ment.. .... .....
Further, at the time of the Reed decision the judiciary did not have
the power to regulate rules of practice and procedure.' 4' Thus, even if
the supreme court in the Reed case was faced with a direct clash between
136. F.A.R. 3.2(b).
137. Ramagli Realty Co. v. Craver, 121 So.2d 648, 652 n.14 (Fla. 1960).
138. 86 Fla. 390, 98 So. 329 (1923).
139. Id. at 392, 98 So. at 330.
140. See note 133 sup ra.
141. As a general proposition there are three sources of power which allow the
judiciary to regulate practice and procedure: statutory enabling acts, constitutional
authority and inherent power. In 1923, there was only a limited statutory enabling act,
no constitutional authority and the Florida courts were not considered as possessing
inherent power to promulgate such rules. In regard to inherent power, see Petition of
Florida State Bar Ass'n. for Promulgation of New Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 145
Fla. 223, 199 So. 57 (1940). Compare this case with the Florida Supreme Court order
integrating the Florida. Bar by virtue of its "inherent" powers and its later pronouncement
in F.A.R. 1.1 that the rules were adopted pursuant to its "inherent" powers,
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its own rules and contrary legislative enactments, the court did not have
the power to prevail.
In 1960, the supreme court had the constitutional power to adopt rules
of practice and procedure. 14 2 Indeed, prior to the constitutional amendment
of 1957 the supreme court through statutory enabling acts, 143 had the
power to regulate practice and procedure in all courts and matters except
probate.
144
Why then does the legislature, and not the judiciary, have the power
to establish appeal times? The answer is simply that both have the power.
However, a legislative enactment will prevail over a contrary rule of court.
This is so because appeal times are substantive in nature. The constitu-
tional grant to the supreme court in article five, section three,145 to regulate
practice and procedure, impliedly incorporates within its terms the prohibi-
tion that the rules must not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
rights of the litigants. 46 In the absence of a legislative enactment, the
judiciary has the power to establish the appeal time requirements. How-
ever, when the legislature has enacted a contrary provision, that provision
is a substantive right which cannot be enlarged, modified or abridged by
the judiciary and thus the legislative enactment must prevail.
The legislative power is not absolute. If the rights of the litigants to
invoke appellate jurisdiction by authorized appellate procedures are so
circumscribed by statutory regulation as to unduly limit or curtail the
right of appeal, it would violate the constitution.
4 7
State v. Furen148 is an illustration of the operation of the substantive
right rationale. In that case an appeal as a matter of right was provided
by statute from the Pinellas County Water and Navigation Control
Authority to the circuit court. This statutory provision conflicts with the
142. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3.
143. Chapter 59 of the Florida Statutes, FLA. STAT. § 59.08 (1959), was enacted
in 1945. This chapter was intended to consolidate, revise and amend the prior chapters
59 and 67 of the Florida Statutes to conform with appellate proceedings generally.
However, the chapter was intended to be controlling only in those situations where
appeal times. were not- provided for by statute. The preamble of the act (Fla. Laws 1945,
ch. 22854) provided: "Whereas, appellate procedure in criminal matters, in probate
matters, in civil cases from most, if not all, inferior courts, is governed by other statutes,
so that Chapters 59 and 67 have only a limited application, if they apply at all, to
appellate proceedings to courts other than the supreme court .... Former section 25.03
provided that the Supreme Court of Florida shall have the power to: "(1) make, amend,
annul, or modify rules of practice or pleading of the supreme court or any other court
as it may see fit not inconsistent with law" (Fla. Laws 1873, ch. 1938, § 12). However,
this section did not apply to probate courts as that court was omitted from the group
of courts to be supervised by the Supreme Court of Florida in section 25.47 (Fla.
Laws 1943, ch. 21995, §§ 1-6, at 688).
144. Ibid.
145. See note 142 subra.
146. State v. Furen, 118 So.2d 6, 11-13 (Fla. 1960).
147. De Bowes v. De Bowes, 149 Fla. 545, 554, 7 So.2d 4, 8 (1942).
148. 118 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1960).
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Florida Appellate Rule which provides that all appeals from administrative
bodies shall be by certiorari. 149 The court indicated that the scope of review
by appeal is greater than the scope of review by certiorari. The method
of review is a substantive right, and thus, the legislative method of review,
appeal, must prevail over the judicial method, certiorari.
It should be recognized that a substantive right rationale presents
difficult problems. The term "substantive right" lends itself to a variety
of meanings. For example, are the rules incidental to the establishment of
appeal times, such as the computation of time, or the tolling of time,
substantive rules?15 It is hoped that the Florida courts will restrict the
use of this rationale for if it finds wide acceptance, the result will be to
qualify the great majority of the appellate rules by the proviso, "unless
the judiciary and should prevail over contrary legislative enactments.
If the appellate rules are to remain effective, the incidental require-
ments of appeal times should be considered peculiarly within the power of
the judiciary and should prevail over contrary legislative enactments.
III. SHORTER APPEAL TIMES
As has been previously stated, a legislative enactment establishing
appeal time requirements will prevail over a contrary rule of court. Thus,
it is not surprising to find that the Florida Appellate Rules have provided
for this result. Rule 3.2(b) provides for a time requirement of 60 days,
"unless some other period of time for taking an appeal is specifically
provided by statute or these rules."' 151
At first blush, the effect of the savings clause was to retain the status
quo as to appeal times as it existed previously under chapter 59 of the
Florida Statutes. 52 A closer analysis reveals that the constitutional basis
for some of the pre-existing statutes had been removed by the 1957 consti-
tutional amendment.
The former article five, section eleven. of the Florida Constitution,
provivded for final appellate jurisdiction in the circuit courts as to certain
149. F.A.R. 4.1.
150. The only indication of the supreme court's position is found in In re Wart-
man's Estate, 128 So.2d 600, 603 (Fla. 1961):
A careful study of the rules will reveal that in those instances where the subject
dealt with is one lying in the grey area between "practice and procedure" and
substantive law, the rule and statute have been preserved out of an abundance
of caution and until such rules have been construed by this Court as falling
within one or the other categories.
For examples of "procedure" as opposed to "substance" see Lundstrom v. Lyon, 86 So.2d
771 (Fla. 1956); Hamel v. Danko, 82 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1955).
151. F.A.R. 3.2(b). See note 131 supra.
152. See note 143 supra. Under the provisions of FLA. STA'r.§ 59.08 (1959) a 60
day time limitation was provided. However, that section only applied in those situations
where an appeal time limitation was not otherwise specifically provided for by statute.
See Fonell v. Williams, 157 Fla. 673, 26 So.2d 800 (1946).
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specified matters and "such other matters as the legislature may provide.' '153
The legislature by virtue of this power source, enacted statutes providing
for appeals to be taken to the circuit court, and in addition provided the
time limitation for prosecuting these appeals. The 1957 constitutional
amendment removed this power source.1 54 The Constitution, as amended,
provides that the appellate jurisdiction of the circuit court consists of final
appellate jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases arising in the county
courts, or before the county judge's court, of all misdemeanors tried in
criminal courts of record, and all cases arising in the municipal courts,
small claims courts and courts of justices of the peace.' 55
Consequently, the statutes which provided for appeals to be prosecuted
to the circuit court in matters other than those specified above, no longer
have any constitutional support, yet they remain on the statute books.
The initial determination that these statutes were no longer effective
occurred in Codorno v. Shai. 156 The problem in that case was the deter-
mination of the proper court to hear an appeal from a final judgment of
the Florida Real Estate Commission suspending the registration of the
petitioner as a real estate broker. The respondents claimed that the peti-
tioner, who had applied for a writ of certiorari to the supreme court, had
a full and complete remedy through an appeal to the circuit court as
provided for by statute, section 475.35 of the Florida Statutes. 1 7 The
supreme court held that the constitutional basis for the statute had been
removed by the constitutional amendment, and thus the petitioners did
not have the right to review by appeal .'58 However, the court held that
the circuit court had the power to issue the common law writ of certiorari
and declined jurisdiction in favor of this action. 59
The Codomo decision was the forerunner of a series of cases all re-
volving about the issue of the constitutional support of these statutes. All
these cases reached the Codomo result. 60 For example:
153. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 11 (1885) (repealed).
154. See, e.g., Codomo v. Shaw, 99 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1958).
155. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 6(3).
156. 99 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1958).
157. Then Fla. Laws 1947, clh. 24090, at 1028 (amended by Fla. Laws 1959, ell.
197). For the proper procedure today see FLA. S'rar. § 475.35 (1959).
158. Codono v. Shaw, 99 So.2d 849, 851 (Fla. 1958).
159. This holding is in direct conflict with the holding in State v. Furen, 118 So.2d
6 (Fla. 1960). In that case the court held that where anl appeal is given as a matter
of right by statute, the statutory method prevails over the appellate rule which in this
case provided that all appeals from administrative bodies shall be by certiorari. The court
indicates that the statutory method, appeal, is a substantive right which cannot be
abridged by the court. The conflict was rendered moot by the subsequent amendment
of the section by Fla. Laws 1959, cl. 197. See FLA. SrAT. § 475.35 (1959).
160. Under the prior statutes a double appeal was given in probate matters; first all
appeal to the circuit court from the probate court, followed by an appeal from the circuit
court to the supreme court. In the following cases, the original appeal was taken to the
circuit court; after the constitutional amendment became effective, the second appeal was
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A. In Rosenblum v. Boss,16' the Third District Court of Appeal
held that the constitutional basis for section 33.11,162 providing for an appeal
from the civil court of record to the circuit court, had been removed, and
the district court of appeal was the proper appellate court under the
constitution as amended.
B. In State v. J. K., 163 a juvenile court was held to be a trial court
within the meaning of article five, section five, subsection three of the
Florida Constitution. Accordingly, the constitutional support for section
39.14164 was removed and appeals were to be taken to the district court
of appeal rather than to the circuit court as provided for by that statute.
C. The case of In re \Vartman's Estate'65 involved an appeal in a
probate matter. The court held that the constitutional support for section
732.16,166 providing for an appeal to the circuit court, had been removed,
and the appeal was properly taken to the district court of appeal under
the constitution as amended.
It may be said as a general rule that when a statute provides for an
appeal to be taken to a specified court other than the court indicated in
the constitution, the constitutional support for such a statute has been
eliminated and the court specified in the constitution is the proper appellate
tribunal.
A. THE PROBLEM OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT FOR STATUTORY
APPEAL TIME REQUIREMENTS
Granting that the constitutional support for the statutory designation
of the appellate tribunal has failed, has the same fate befallen the appeal
time requirements found in these statutes?
It must be noted that the appellate rules were enacted subsequent to
the constitutional amendment. Thus, the savings clause of rule 3.2(b),
unless otherwise provided for by statute, can not work a resurrection of
statutes providing for appeal times which had fallen prior to the effective
date of the appellate rules.
Up until March, 1961, no court in Florida had discussed the problem
of whether or not the constitutional support for the appellate time re-
dismissed on the grounds that the constitutional basis for such an appeal had been
removed. In re Wood's Estate, 114 So.2d 640 (Fla. App. 1959); In re Juen's Estate, 105
So.2d 908 (Fla. App. 1958); 'In re Rasey's Estate, 105 So.2d 904 (Fla. App. 1958).
161. 101 So.2d 596, 598 (Fla. App. 1958). Accord, Fuller v. Riley, 124 So.2d 499
(Fla. App. 1960); Foster v. Rauzin, 11 Fla. Supp. 180 (Cir. Ct. 1958).
162. FLA. STAT. § 33.11 (1959).
163. 104 So.2d 113, 116 (Fla. App. 1958). Accord, In re Evans, 116 So.2d 783
(Fla. App. 1960); In re C.E.S., 106 So.2d 610 (Fla. App. 1958).
164. FLA. STAT. § 39.14 (1959).
165. 118 So.2d 838, 839 (Fla. App. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 128 So.2d 600
(Fla. 1961).
166. FLA STAT. § 732.16 (1959).
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quirements established by statutes had been removed. However, the shorter
appeal time requirements were continued as effective, apparently either
by retaining the statutory provisions inviolate, or by allowing the appellate
rules to work a resurrection of these statutes.'
In the leading case of In re Wartman's Estate,1 8 the Third District
Court of Appeal certified to the supreme court the question of whether
the period of appeal from final orders or decrees of the county judge's
court in probate matters was 30 days, as provided for by section 732.16(2) 19
of the Florida Statutes, or 60 days, as provided for by rule 3.2(b) 170 and
section 59.08171 of the Florida Statutes.
In a unanimous opinion the Florida Supreme Court held that the
time for appeals was 60 days rather than 30 days.' 7
2
The court reasoned that under the former constitutional provisions,
appellate jurisdiction was lodged in the circuit court in cases arising before
judges of the county courts in matters pertaining to their probate jurisdic-
tion and in the management of the estates of infants. The statutes govern-
ing appellate times for probate proceedings were enacted under the
authority of this constitutional provision and were designed to implement
it. Today, the present constitution does not grant this appellate jurisdiction
to the circuit courts. The appellate jurisdiction of the circuit court and the
right of double appeal provided for and implemented by this statute no
longer exists. Therefore, all statutory sections referring to this appellate
avenue, including shorter appeal times, have fallen under the onslaught
of the constitutional amendment.
The court was of the opinion that the shorter appeal time provision
of the statute must fail under the principles of statutory interpretation.
The court footnoted as follows:
If any of the provisions of the act that are held to be illegal,
induced to any appreciable extent its passage, the entire act fails
in view of the interdependence of the provisions ....
In such cases, the test is whether the court can say that the
legislature would not have enacted the law under scrutiny except
for the provision held unconstitutional. Where the objectionable
provision is an integral part of the statute and cannot be separated
from it without doing violence to the legislative intent, the entire
statute will be held invalid. 1
78
167. See Fuller v. Riley, 124 So.2d 499 (Fla. App. 1960).
168. 128 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1961). Followed in In're Estate of Robertson, 131 So.2d
7 (Fla. 1961); Congregation Temple De Hirsch v. Aronson, 128 So.2d 585 (Fla. 1961);
Whitaker v. Jacksonville Expressway Authority, 129 So.2d 188 (Fla. App. 1961) (ex-
plained); In re Mullin's Estate, 128 So.2d 617 (Fla. App. 1961).
169. FLA. STAT. § 732.16(2) (1959).
170. F.A.R. 3.2(b).
171. FLA. STAT. § 59.08 (1959).
172. In re Wartman's Estate, 128 So.2d 600, 605 (Fla. 1961).
173. Id.'at 604 n.12.
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The court summarily disposed of the respondent's argument that the
30 day provision of the statute was revived by the Florida Appellate Rules,
by holding that the court, through the appellate rules, has no constitu-
tional authority to revive a portion of an unconstitutional statute. 174
The impact of the Wartman decision cannot be overemphasized.
Hereafter, the time for taking an appeal in probate matters, and cases
concerning estates and interests of minors and incompetents, shall be 60
days. In addition, all other statutes which refer to the applicability of
the probate appeal time provisions will also be governed by this decision. 175
In other areas where the constitutional support for the appellate pro-
visions has been removed, an inquiry must be launched as to whether the
objectionable provision is an integral part of the whole statute, or whether
it can be separated from the statute without doing violence to the legisla-
tive intent.17 6
In this connection, a survey of the cases indicates that they can be
divided into two categories: (1) those cases and statutes establishing a
shorter appeal time because of special subject matters, and (2) those
cases and statutes dealing with appeal time requirements from courts
without regard to specific subject matters.
Civil Appeals - Special Subject Matter
ACTIONS INVOLVING THE REMOVAL OF TENANTS
In Placid York Co. v. Calvert Hotel Co.,'"7 the plaintiff brought a
petition for the removal of a tenant in the civil court of record and received
a final judgment in his favor. The appeal time requirement of two days17
was not met, and the district court of appeal dismissed the appeal. The
court indicated that the statute provided for an immediate and limited
appeal period in order to assure speedy relief to a landlord against a de-
faulting tenant. It is to be noted that the court did not consider the 60
day limitation provided for by the appellate rules as controlling. The court
assumed that the statutory time period, as provided for in a pre-existing
statute, remained in force after the adoption of the appellate rules.
RESTORATION OF THE STATUS OF COMPETENCY
In the case of In re Guardianship of Campbell,179 an appeal from
an order of the county judge was taken to the district court of appeal
174. Id. at 604.
175. For example, FLA. STAT. § 393.12(4) (1959) provides that the probate
statutory time limitation, FLA. STAT. § 732.16 (1959) is controlling. In that the probate
statutory time is now invalid, the general provisions of F.A.R. 3.2(b) and FLA. STAT.
§ 59.08 (1959) will control, viz., 60 days.
176. Evidently this is to be the test. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
For an illustration of the use of this test see infra notes 183-90.
177. 109 So.2d 604 (Fla. App. 1959).
178. FLA. STAT. § 83.27 (1959).
179. 114 So.2d 352 (Fla. App. 1959).
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some 50 days after the entry of the order. Florida Statutes, section 394.2218°
provided for an appeal time requirement of 15 days. The court held that
this time requirement was within the savings clause of rule 3.2(b), and
dismissed the appeal.
JUVENILE COURTS
In the case of In re Evan's Estate,' an appeal from a final child
custody order of the juvenile court was taken to the district court of
appeal. The court raised the issue of jurisdiction, sua sponte, when it
appeared that the appeal was taken after the 10 day limitation provided
for by section 39.14182 of the Florida Statutes had expired, and accordingly
dismissed the appeal. It is to be noted that the court made reference to
the necessity of a shorter appeal time in this special proceedings. The court
stated:
There is sound basis in reason and logic why appeals from special
statutory proceedings should be limited to a period of time less
than that normally provided for appeals from final judgments. Ac-
celerating the time for appeals so that the status of the juvenile
may be promptly settled was within the legitimate discretion of
the legislature and comes within the exception in Rule 3.2(b)
Fla. App. Rules .... 188
Are the Shorter Appeal Time Statutes Still Effective?
Subsequent to the initial writing of this paper, the First District Court
of Appeal was faced with this very problem. In Whitaker v. Jacksonville
Expressway Authority, 8" an appeal was taken within the 60 day time re-
quirement of the Florida Appellate Rules but without the 30 day time
period provided for by statute'85 in eminent domain proceedings. The
court discussed Wartman and pointed out that in Wartman the double
right of appeal provision was so interrelated to the appeal time provisions
as to make all the statutory provisions inseparable.8 6 Thus, when one fell
the other fell. The court further indicated that the double right of appeal
was not present in the appellate procedures of the eminent domain
statutes. 187 Accordingly the court held that the entire appellate procedures
180. FLA. STAr. § 394.22 (1959).
181. 116 So.2d 783 (Fla. App. 1960).
182. FLA. STAT. § 39.14 (1959).
183. In re Evan's Estate, 116 So.2d 783, 784 (Fla. App. 1960). (Emphasis added.)
184. 129 So.2d 188 (Fla. App. 1961).
185. FLA. STAT. § 73.14 (1959).





did not fall as a result of the constitutional amendment; rather the effect
of the amendment was to amend:
by implication the above quoted section of the statute relating to
appeals from final judgments entered in eminent domain proceed-
ings by substituting the district courts of appeal for the Supreme
Court as the proper forum to which appeals should be taken .... ll
As a result the 30 day time period was not invalidated but was preserved
as determinative under the authority of Wartman and the savings clause 8 9
of the Florida Appellate Rules.
It is to be noted that the court in no way sustained the statute on
the grounds of the existence of a special subject matter. Instead, the court
hinged its holding on the existence or non-existence of a double right of
appeal provision. In Whitaker a finding that the double right of appeal
provision did not exist necessarily led to the conclusion that the appeal
time was severable from the invalid portions and thus preserved inviolate.
The Whitaker case stands for the following short-hand proposition:
a double right of appeal before the 1957 constitutional amendment equals
invalidation of the appeal time provisions after the amendment, while
one right of appeal to the supreme court before the 1957 constitutional amend-
ment equals substitution of the district courts of appeal for the supreme
court without change in the shorter appeal time after the amendment' 90
It is the writer's opinion that the shorter appeal time statutes remain
inviolate. The common thread running through the shorter appeal time
statutes is the manifestation of the legislature's desire to terminate litiga-
tion promptly due to the special subject matter of the statutes. A Florida
court following the Wartman test could deduce that the legislature would
have provided for shorter appeal times even in the absence of the now
invalid portions of the statutes relating to certain appellate procedures.
On the other hand, the Wartman decision indicates that if the
constitutional support for these certain appellate provisions has been
removed and these provisions are interdependent with the appeal time
provisions of these statutes, the constitutional support for the appeal time
provisions has failed also. This result may be avoided through a finding
that the shorter appeal time provisions are not interdependent with the
invalid appellate procedures as in the Vhitaker case. A decision of invalidity
would probably trigger an immediate legislative reaction of re-enacting the
shorter appeal time provisions for most special subject matters.
188. Id. at .193.
189. F.A.R. 3.2(b).
190. An attempt was made to certify the Whitaker case to the supreme court as a
decision passing upon a question.. of great public interest. Whitaker v. Jacksonville
Expressway Authority, 131 So.2d 22 (Fla. App. 1961). This attempt failed due to
procedural defects. See note 48 supra.
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Civil Appeals 7 Courts
SHORTER APPEAL TIMES FOR COURTS
Under the prior constitutional provisions, the legislature had the power
to create courts and establish final appellate jurisdiction in the circuit
courts. These provisions have been repealed by the 1957 constitutional
amendment. Consequently, the Wartman rationale should be applicable in
this area and the shorter appeal time provisions, interdependent upon the
invalid appellate procedures and unsupported by any other power source,
should fail.
APPEALS FROM THE CIVIL COURT OF RECORD
Prior to the Wartman decision, the Third District Court of Appeal
indicated that the time limitation of "one calendar month" provided for
by section 33.11' 1 of the Florida Statutes could not be sustained. In a
footnote to In re Guardianship of Campbell9 2 the court stated:
It should be noted that although the Supreme Court held . . . that
section 33.11 . . . limited the tihiie for appeals formerly had from
the Civil Court of Record to the circuit court to "one calendar
month", that the period for appeal from the Civil Court of
Record to the District Court of Appeal is now the same as for
appeals from circuit courts, that is, 60 days.... This is true for
the reason that under the prior constitutional provision, section
33.11 ... provided a special method of appeal. This special appeal
was abolished by the present constitutional provision ....
However, when this exact situation was presented to this same court
in Fuller v. Riley,9 3 the court sustained the statute as within the excep-
tion of 3.2(b) and held that the proper time limitation was "one calendar
month." The court did not dismiss the appeal because of the footnote
cited above, but announced that it would henceforth follow its present
pronouncement. The court did not attempt to distinguish the other cases,
but rather on the authority of the prior cases, sustained the shorter appeal
time.
The supreme court by its decision in Wartman has impliedly reversed
the position of the district court of appeal in the Fuller case. The sole
power source for the legislature to enact statutory provisions was the now
repealed provisions allowing the legislature to create courts and establish
final appellate jurisdiction in the circuit courts. There is no reason to
suppose that the legislature would have intended the shorter appeal time
provisions relating to courts to survive the invalidation of the interde-
191. FLA. STAT. § 33.11 (1959).
192. 114 So.2d 352, 354 n.3 (Fla. App. 1959).
193. 124 So. 2d 499 (Fla. App. 1960) (Pearson, 1. dissented on other grounds).
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pendent prescribed appellate procedure.
The rationale of the Whitaker94 case, if applied to a factual situation
concerning the one calendar month appeal time from the civil court of
record will likewise invalidate the shorter appeal time. It is to be noted
that the Whitaker case was distinguished from Wartman because of the
absence of the double right of review provision in the eminent domain
statutes.195 As a result, the court in effect held that the invalid appellate
procedures were severable from the shorter appeal time provision of the
eminent domain statutes.
The appellate procedure established in chapter 33 of the Florida
Statutes contains provisions for a double review of the cause. 196 Thus, even
the Whitaker court would reach the Wartman result, viz., invalidation of
the entire appellate procedure, in a case like Fuller.
It appears that the constitutional support for the implementing ap-
pellate procedure provisions of chapter 33, including the shorter appeal
time provision of one calendar month has been removed. Consequently,
the 60 day time limitation of Florida Appellate Rule 3.2(b)' 97 and section
59.08198 of the Florida Statutes should be controlling. 99
APPEALS FROM THE MUNICIPAL COURTS
Rule 6.2 provides for a 90 day appeal time for a defendant convicted
in a criminal action. 200 Rule 6.3 provides for a 30 day appeal time for the
state.201 Section 932.52 of the Florida Statutes provides for a 30 day appeal
time for a defendant from a criminal conviction in a municipal court.
202
The district court of appeal discussed the conflict between these two
194. Whitaker v. Jacksonville Expressway Authority, 129 So.2d 188 (Fla. App. 1961).
195. See supra notes 184-90.
196. FLA. STAT. § 33.11 (1959) provides for an appeal to be prosecuted to the
circuit court within one calendar month. FLA. STAT. § 33.12 (1959) provides for
certiorari to the supreme court within 30 days. However, the review of the cause is to
be as if "it had been carried by a writ of error." Thbe ultimate result should be an appeal
to the district court of appeal within 60 days provided for by the appellate rule, with the
supreme court exercising appellate jurisdiction when applicable under the constitutional
provisions, e.g., conflict among the district courts of appeal.
197. F.A.R. 3.2(b).
198. FLA. STAT. § 59.08 (1959).
199. Subsequent to the submission of this article for publication, the Third District
Court of Appeal reversed its holding in the Fuller case and thus sustained the position
taken in the text. See Ed Lane Auto Sales, Inc. v. Weinstein, 132 So.2d 218 (Fla. App.
1961) (60 day time to appeal).
200. F.A.R. 6.2 provides: "Any appeal by the defendant shall be taken within 90
days after the judgment is entered, or from the judgment or sentence, or both, within 90
days after the sentence is entered."
201. F.A.R. 6.3 provides:
An appeal may be taken by the state only within thirty days after the order or
sentence appealed from is entered, except that when the defendant takes an
appeal from the judgment the state may, not later than ten days after the
defendant files his assignments of error and serves a copy thereof, take an appeal
authorized by Section 924.07(4), Florida Statutes . ...
202. FLA. STAT. § 935.52(2) (1959).
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provisions in City of Miami v. Gilbert.203 The court stated that section
932.52, under which the instant appeal was taken, had been superseded
by the Florida Appellate Rules in all respects when there was a conflict.
The Second District Court of Appeal was faced with the same situa-
tion in Clark v. City of Orlando.20 That court reached an opposite result
on the grounds that rule 6.1 did not deal with appeals from municipal
courts to circuit courts. Rule 3.2(b) was held to be controlling, with the
result that the savings clause continued the statute, section 932.52(b),
in effect.
The court recognized that the appellate rules had been amended to
make rules 6.2 and 6.3 applicable to appeals from municipal courts to the
circuit courts in criminal cases,205 but the court indicated that the appeal
in the present case was taken prior to the effective date of the amendment
and refused to pass upon the applicability of the amended rule with ref-
erence to the time for taking appeals.
It should be noted that under the former constitutional provisions the
circuit court had appellate jurisdiction to hear appeals from municipal
courts. This provision continued unchanged under the constitution as
amended. The rule of Wartman is not applicable in this situation because
the constitutional support for the implementing statute has not been
removed.20
Rule 6.1207 does not incorporate within its provisions a savings clause
as contained in rule 3.2(b) .20S When the problem is next presented the
stage will be set for the court to consider directly the problem as to what
provision should prevail, a rule of court, or a statutory provision.
B. SHORTER APPEAL TNIES FOR INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS
AND APPEALABLE MOTIONS
One further problem is to be considered. Assuming that the shorter
appeal time provided for by statutes is controlling in appeals from final
judgments, is it also controlling in interlocutory appeals and other ap-
pealable motions not final in their nature? There is no answer to this
question, as of this date. In Edwards v. Miami Shores Village'20 9 an appeal
was taken from an order granting a new trial in a condemnation proceed-
ing. The problem was whether section 59.08210 providing for 60 days, or
203. 102 So.2d 818, 819 n.1 (Fla. App. 1958).
204. 109 So.2d 416 (Fla. App. 1959).
205. F.A.R. 6.1 as amended provides: "Appeals in criminal cases to the Supreme
Court, the district courts of appeal and to the circuit courts (including appeals from
municipal courts), shall be prosecuted in accordance with Part VI of these rules.
206. See notes 168-76 supra and accompanying text.
207. F.A.R. 6.1.
208. F.A.R. 3.2(b).
209. 40 So.2d 360 (Fla. 1949).
210. FLA. STAT. §59.08 (1959).
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section 73.14211 which provided for a time limitation of 30 days controlled.
The court held that the shorter appeal time provided for in section 73.14
was not confined to final judgments but extended to all reviewable orders
within the scope of the statute's subject matter.2 12 Under this reasoning,
in every appeal, whether interlocutory or final in nature, the shorter appeal
time of the statutes will control.
The only contrary statement occurred some eight years later, and then
it was obiter dictum. In Houk v. Dade County,2 13 an appeal was prosecuted
from a post-final judgment order refusing to allow a fee for services of
the defendant's attorney in a prior appeal in which they were successful.
The court held that it did not have jurisdiction because the 30 day limita-
tion of section 73.14 had expired. The court assumed, but did not decide,
that the statute would not govern petitions for certiorari, or interlocutory
orders.2
14
The stronger position is the stand taken in the Edwards case, for there
is absolutely no reason to distinguish an interlocutory order from a final
order once the legislature by statute has determined that the subject matter
of the action necessitates a shorter appeal time.21 5
IV. CERTIORARI AS THE METHOD OF REVIEW
The supreme court has the sole power to establish time limitations
when review of the controversy is to be had through the medium of a
writ of certiorari as opposed to the use of an appeal.2 1.6
Since 1865217 the Florida Constitution has provided a power grant of
original jurisdiction in the supreme court to supervise the lower courts.2 18
In this connection, the supreme court has the power to issue extraordinary
writs, for example: prohibition, quo warranto, mandamus and common
law certiorari. This power grant cannot be extended, limited or regulated
211. FLA. STAT. § 73.14 (1959).
212. Edwards v. Miami Shores Village, 40 So.2d 360, 361 (Fla. 1949).
213. 97 So.2d 272 (Fla. 1957).
214. Id. at 273.
215. See note 183 supra and accompanying text.
216. Wilson v. McCoy Mfg. Co., 69 So.2d 659 (Fla. 1954); Atlantic Coast Line
R.R. v. Mack, 64 So.2d 304 (Fla. 1952); State ex rel. Buckwalter v. City of Lake-
land, 112 Fla. 200, 150 So. 508 (1933); Brinson v. Tharin, 99 Fla. 696, 127 So.
313 (1930).
217. The 1861 and 1865 Florida Constitutions provided that "the said court
shall always have the power to issue writs of injunction, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus, and such other original and remedial writs as may be necessary to give
it a general superintendence and control of all other courts." This provision appeared
originally in the 1845 constitution. The power grant as read today provides: "The
Supreme Court may issue all writs necessary or proper to a complete exercise of its
jurisdiction." FLA. CONST. art V, § 4(2).
218. The power grant set forth in note 217 supra, was interpreted in Ex parte
White, 4 Fla. 165 (1851) to provide a two-fold power grant, one of which is "a
general superintendence and control of all other courts, and this by means of all
appropriate, original and remedial writs known to common law." Ex parte White,
supra at 173. When the present wording of the provision was interpreted in Florida v.
1961]
54 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
by statute.219 Thus, as between a statute and the Florida Appellate Rules,
the rules providing for time limitations in the excercise of this jurisdiction
will prevail.
Common law certiorari is to be distinguished from statutory or consti-
tutional certiorari. 220 The latter term is normally used to designate situa-
tions where a review on the merits is had through certiorari.
The power to establish time requirements for the exercise of statutory
certiorari is also within the power of the judiciary.
In Wyman v. Nussbaum,22' the supreme court was faced with a
conflict between the 60 day time limitation of section 59.08 for filing a
petition for writ of certiorari, and the 30 day time limitation of section
12, chapter 8221 of the Laws of Florida, 1921. The court held that the
60 day time requirement was the proper one. It is to be noted that chapter
59 at the time of this decision applied only to review by the supreme court.
In the later case of Smith v. Fletcher Motor Sales, Inc.,222 the court
reached an opposite result. The petitioner argued that section 59.08 was
intended to provide a uniform alternative method of appeal from orders
of state boards and commissions, 223 and thus the 60 day time requirement
of section 59.08 controlled rather than the 30 day requirement provided
by the workmen's compensation statutes. 224 The court held that in this
peculiar situation the workmen's compensation statute controlled, and the
petition for the writ of certiorari was denied.
225
The court reasoned that in this particular litigation, it is the policy
of the legislature to provide a speedy method of review. To effect a change
in this salutary policy would seem, to require an express legislative mandate
directed specifically to appeals in workmen's compensation cases.226 The
court reinforced its reasoning by indicating that the legislature in the
subsequent re-enactment of-the workmen's compensation statutes provided
Gleason, 12 Fla. 190 (1868), the court followed the interpretation of the provision as
made in Ex parte White, supra, even though the writs were not individually specified.
219. Brinson v. Tharin, 99 Fla. 696, 127 So. 313 (1930).
220. Broadly speaking, common law certiorari is used by a superior tribunal to
review the actions of an inferior tribunal where it has exceeded its jurisdiction, or has
not proceeded in accordance with the essential requirements of the law in cases where
no direct appellate proceedings are provided for by law. Common law certiorari can
not be used to question the correctness of the lower court's judgment on the merits.
Saffran v. Adler, 152 Fla. 405, 12 So.2d 124 (1943). See also Adams & Miller,
Origins and Current Status of the Extraordinary Vrits, 4 U. FLA. L. REv. 421, 448,
460 (1951).
221. 159 Fla. 813, 32 So.2d 824 (1947). Contra, Sirman v. Conklin, 154 Fla.
304, 17 So.2d 298 (1944).
222. 62 So.2d 60 (Fla. 1952).
223. See note 143 supra.
224. Fla. Laws 1935, ch. 17481, § 27, at 1479 (repealed). See generally FLA.
STAT. § 440.27 (1959).




for the statute's appellate procedures to be controlling in all cases of
inconsistency.
227
Two years later, the supreme court on the same facts reached an
opposite conclusion. In Wilson v. McCoy Mfg. Co., 228 the court, without
mentioning the Smith decision, held that the 60 day requirement of
Supreme Court Rule 28229 prevailed over the 30 day requirement of the
workmen's compensation statute.
230
Any further controversy in this area was rendered moot by the subse-
quent amendment of section 440.27 to provide for a 60 day time limitation
for petitioning for a writ of certiorari.
2 3 1
The Wilson decision stands for the proposition that for statutory cer-
tiorari, as well as for common law certiorari, the judiciary has the power
to establish time limitations for petitioning for the writ, and in situations
where the rules of court conflict with statutes, the rules will prevail.
V. APPEALS FROM ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES
The Florida Appellate Rules provide that appeals from administrative
bodies shall be by certiorari. 23 2 The rules further provide that the time
requirement for petitioning for the writ shall be 60 days from rendition.
233
All statutes and rules in conflict with the Florida Appellate Rules have
been superseded.23 4 Thus, the time limitation of 60 days for applying for
the writ governs all situations where review is had by certiorari.
A word of caution must be added at this point. When a statute
provides that the method of review from an administrative body shall be
by appeal, certiorari will not be available. In State v. Furen,23 - the Supreme
Court of Florida held that the right to an appeal is a substantive right
which cannot be enlarged or abridged by the judiciary. Further, in such
situations the legislative mandates will prevail over rules of court.
Even in a State v. Furen situation, when an appeal as a matter of
right must be accorded to the litigants, it is arguable that the 60 day
limitation of section 59.08 is applicable rather than a shorter period of
time as provided for by statute.
The supreme court in Fonel v. Williams, 23 6 stated that chapter 59
227. Ibid.
228. 69 So.2d 659 (Fla. 1954).
229. Sup. CT. R. 28 (1957).
230. Fla. Laws 1935, ch. 17481, § 27, at 1479 (repealed). See generally, Fi.
STAT. § 440.27 (1959).
231. Fla. Laws 1935, ch. 17481, § 27, at 1479 was subsequently amended by
Fla. Laws 1955, ch. 29778 (codified as FiA. STAT. § 440.27 (1959)), to provide an
appeal time of 60 days, which corresponds with the supreme court's holding in Wilson




235. 118 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1960).
236. 157 Fla. 673, 675, 26 So.2d 800, 801 (1946).
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was intended to consolidate, revise and amend chapters 59 and 67, to con-
form them to current court rules, and "to extend them to appellate proceed-
ings from orders of state boards, commissions and other bodies where
appeals are allowed." This construction by the supreme court is a proper
one. For example, section 59.01(2) (a) provides that the chapter shall also
be applicable: "As a uniform alternative method of taking appeals from
orders of state boards, commissions, and other bodies, where appeals from
such orders are permitted by law .... .27
Section 59.43, dealing with the application of the chapter, includes
within its application appellate proceedings from boards, commissions and
other bodies where provided for by law, and "where otherwise provided
may be used as an alternative method of review.
' 238
It is at this point that it is well to recall the prior discussion of the
Smith v. Fletcher Motor Sales23" and Wilson v. McCoy cases. 240 In the
Smith case, the petitioner argued that the uniform alternative method of
taking an appeal from an administrative body allowed him to take his
appeal within 60 days rather than the 30 days provided by the workmen's
compensation statutes. The court rejected this argument and held that
the shorter time limitation of section 440.35 prevailed.
The holding of the case should be confined to workmen's compensa-
tion proceedings and not extended to reviews of other administrative bodies
for two reasons: (1) The court implied that workmen's compensation
cases are unique,21 and require a shorter period of time to fulfill the
purpose of the statute. The corrollary to this proposition is that other
statutes do not occupy this unique position. The court in the Smith case
did not decide that the chapter was inapplicable as an alternative method
of appeal from all administrative bodies, but rather that the decision, was,
by implication, limited to workmen's compensation cases. (2) The court
was able to show the unique nature of the workmen's compensation statute
by directing attention to a subsequent legislative declaration which
specifically provided that the provisions of the statute were controlling in
preference to other statutes or rules inconsistent with the statutory pro-
visions.2 4 2 Other statutes providing for shorter appeal times do not contain
237. FLA. STAr. § 59.01(2)(a) (1959).
238. FLA. STAT. § 59.43 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
239. 62 So.2d 60 (Fla. 1952).
240. 69 So.2d 659 (Fla. 1954).
241. Smith v. Fletcher Motor Sales, Inc., 62 So.2d 60. 61 (Fla. 1952). The court
stated: "From the history of the Workmen's Compensation Act, . . . it is apparent
that in this particular class of cases it is the policy of the Legislature to provide a
speedy method of appeal in order to secure to injured workers as quickly as possible the
compensation provided for them under the Act ..
242. Id. at 61.
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this legislative declaration. Indeed the enactment of chapter 59, with the
express purpose of providing an alternative method of appeal from ad-
ministrative bodies, can be taken as a legislative declaration that the 60
day time limitation of section 59.08243 was intended to be controlling, as
opposed to the prior statutory provisions.
A. WHAT COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW TE ACTIONS
OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES?
All three appellate tribunals - the supreme court, the district courts
of appeal and the circuit courts - have the constitutional power to review
administrative proceedings.
Circuit Courts
An administrative hearing is considered quasi-judicial in character and
is not a true trial court hearing. The proceedings do not appear in the
judicial department as a judicial case until they are brought into the court
system.244 Accordingly, the circuit courts, through the power grant of
original jurisdiction contained in the Constitution of Florida, have original
jurisdiction to review administrative actions. 241
When the circuit courts review administrative actions they operate
as trial courts. The district courts of appeal are vested with appellate
jurisdiction to hear appeals from "trial courts," unless an appeal as a
matter of right may be prosecuted to the supreme court. Accordingly, a
type of double review of administrative action is provided for by the
Florida Constitution.
2 46
District Courts of Appeal
The jurisdiction of the district courts of appeal to review administra-
243. FLA. STAT. § 59.08 (1959).
244. State v. Furen, 118 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1960); Fraternal Order of Eagles v.
Proudfoot, 116 So.2d 245 (Fla. 1959); South Atl. S.S. Co. v. Tutson, 139 Fla. 405,
190 So. 675 (1939).
245. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 6(3) provides: '"'l'c circuit courts shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases in equity . . . in all cases at law not cognizable by
subordinate courts ....
246. FLA. CoNs'r. art. V, § 5(3) provides that appeals from trial courts in each
appellate district may be taken to the court of appeal of such district as a matter of
right.
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tive action is limited to those appeals provided for by law.24 7 For example,
the review of the proceedings of the Florida Air Pollution Control Com-
mission, by statute, are to be taken to the district court of appeal.2 4
8
Supreme Court
The Constitution of Florida provides that the supreme court may
issue writs of certiorari to commissions established by law.2 49 It is to be
noted that the exercise of this jurisdiction is discretionary with the court.
The difficult problem in this area is caused by the overlapping of
jurisdiction of the supreme court and the circuit courts. One point is
certain-an appeal must be taken to the circuit court when a statute
provides for appeal as the method of appellate review.2 5 0 However, when
no method of review is provided for by statute, or where review is to
be had by certiorari as provided for by statute, both courts may exercise
jurisdiction to review administrative action.
In the absence of any established procedure, it is contemplated that
the supreme court will decline jurisdiction, as it did in Codomo v. Shaw,
251
in favor of the circuit court assuming jurisdiction. In similar situations the
circuit court will operate as a trial court to build a record upon which a
review may be predicated. On 'the other hand, when there is a complete
record, capable of review, the supreme court should assume jurisdiction
and review the action.
252
It is arguable that when the circuit court reviews administrative action
it acts as a trial court and the applicable Florida Appellate Rules do not
apply. However, the appellate rules contemplate that they should apply
with equal force to review of administrative action as seen by rule 1.3,





In large part, the problems presented in this article arose from the
fact'that after each change in the law respecting appellate times, the prior
247. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 5(3).
248. FLA. STAT. § 403.19 (1959).
249. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(2).
250. State v. Furen, 118 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1960).
251. 99 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1958).




statutes and rules were retained on the statute books. These problems were
compounded in that the Florida Appellate Rules, which provided that all
statutes in conflict with the rules were superseded, did not designate the
statutes which were in fact to be superseded. The conflicting cases which
have arisen to plague the practitioner are the result of this policy of over-
simplification.
From this conflict a few guiding principles have developed. It is un-
questioned that legislative enactments dealing with appeal times will prevail
over contrary rules of court. These statutes create substantive rights which
cannot be abridged or enlarged by rules of court.
However, the power of the judiciary to establish time requirements
for the filing of petitions for writs of certiorari is unquestioned. The legis-
lature may indirectly claim this power by the simple expedient of enacting
statutes providing for an appeal as the method of appellate review which
must be given as a matter of substantive right.
The truly pressing problem is the need for a more exact classification
of a rule as to what is substantive and what is procedural. The grey area
between substantive rights and practice and procedure casts an ominous
shadow on the effectiveness of the appellate rules. If the incidental require-
ments of appeal times, such as the filing of the appeal, and the tolling
of the time for appeal, are construed to be substantive in nature, then
the Florida Appellate Rules will become a mere shell, for one would now
read into the great majority of its provisions the proviso, "unless otherwise
provided for by statute."
During the progress of this writing, the decision of In re Wartman's
Estate 25, 4 was handed down by the supreme court. It is impossible to
determine the full repercussions of this decision. Some possible points of
distinction and some analogies have been presented as well as other specula-
ions. Suffice to say that the opinion serves to maintain the effectiveness
of the Florida Appellate Rules.
Finally, it is submitted that there is no logical reason for a variation
of the time 'limitation for appeals from court to court. Only in those
situations where there is a necessity for a shorter appeal time due to the
peculiar nature of the subject matter of the action, should pre-existing
statutes be held to remain inviolate under the constitution as amended.
The Florida Appellate Rules should be considered remedial in nature
and therefore should be liberally construed. It must be remembered that
one of the reasons for the failure of common law pleading and practice
was the undue importance placed upon technicalities and form rather
254. 128 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1961).
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than upon the merits of the cause. The courts of this state would do well
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Rendition F.A.R. 3.2(b)
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COIEI'NTS
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109 So.2d 416 (Fla. App. 1959).
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5. This provision nly applies to dc
Is.o apiah. When tS circu t court
sits as a trial court (as in this situa-
tion) a further appeal can be taken
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application of he Orlsnd ase. (See
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104 So.2d 113 (Fla. App. 1950).
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10. Ed Lane Auto Sales, Inc. v.
Wcinstein, 132 So.2d 218 (Fla. App.
1961).
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F.A.R. 3.2(b) and Fla. Stat. 59.08
control the time for appeal.
13. Fla. Stan. 393.12(4) and 746.16
provide that Fla. Stat. 732.16 controls
the appeal time. 1Iowr-er, Fla. Stat.
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In re Watmarns Estate, Tms, F.A.R.
3.2(b) is now applicable.
14. See note 13 snpra.
FCR. 6.2 and 6.3 govern all criminal
appeals (see Municipal Courts-Criminal A rpeals).
Entry of order Ia. Star
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See F.A.R. 6.2 and 6.3 which goveru












































































L-0 "a. "a 9
C)C ) 1^ C
0 0- 00
< i Ct Cc~ C
2uCu C "2u uu C Cu
0
- 'C
C -I
C -
Cu
Ce-U
v0t
r- CO
C)-
0 0
o0C-
C
2 ~C
o
4-' -~
C Cu-'
2 -~
I~ ~Q
